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Most industries have a life cycle. An early stage of
developing technology, false starts, successes and failures
is followed by a boom phase when all the driving forces
behind development come together and offer the pro® ts that
drive the boom. Later there is maturity when markets
become saturated, competition increases, and resources for
development become scarce. Then death, when the ® nal
blow comes, perhaps from a new technology that renders the
entire industry obsolete overnight, perhaps from competition
from overseas that makes it hopelessly uneconomic.
In the UK we have seen this in, perhaps ® rst, the woollen
industry when natural resourceÐ largely sheep and waterÐ
met technology in the form of mechanized spinning and
weaving and had access to huge local and later overseas
markets. The pattern repeats with variations such as cotton
where Imperial possessions provided both raw material
supply and markets and British manufacturing technology
contributed the developments that allowed us to take
advantage of them. Iron, steel, coal, railways, the heavy
chemical industry, the list goes on and whilst they are not all
the same by any means, they show common life cycle
features.
The same cycle is re¯ ected in miniature in individual
plants within the industry. New processes take over, such
as the development of steel-making furnaces, or plants
collapse through sheer old age and unreliability.
The UK offshore oil industry is at middle age in this
cycle; because of the rapid wave of growth so are the bulk of
the plants involved. The technology which was pioneering
in the early days is now established, and the world oil
market has put extreme pressure on costs. Spending habits
that have grown up at $30 or $40 a barrel cannot be
maintained at $15. The national asset of our oil® elds is in
one sense priceless and yet useless if we cannot exploit it
economically.
This carries with it risks. One would have to be very
idealistic, or naive, to believe that there is no temptation to
keep old plant running cheaply by the application of
judicious neglect. It is a technique all too common in the
onshore chemical industry where, however, what is at stake
is usually not so dramatic. The public reaction to the
awesome and tragic consequences of disasters such as
Alexander Keilland or Piper Alpha have forced review of
the checks and balances, the regulation of the industry, and
created an additional dimension to the problem of com-
bining maturity with pro® tability, that of compliance with
regulatory requirements.
We are arguably fortunate in having a safety regulatory
history in the UK over the past 25 years or so that has been
moving away from rigid prescription. The Robens report is
usually taken as the watershed and the apposite quotation is:
`There is a role for regulatory law and a role for Government
action. But these roles should be predominantly concerned
not with detailed prescription for innumerable day-to-day
circumstances but with in¯ uencing attitudes and creating a
framework for better safety and health organisation and
action by industry itself.’
Robens, 1972
The UK Health and Safety Commission and Executive
developed a goal-setting, rather than prescriptive, regime
® rst in onshore industry, notably for nuclear and chemi-
cal major hazard installations. The offshore industry
remained longer under more detailed prescription, until
Piper Alpha and the Cullen report. Lord Cullen contrasted
the approaches and was enamoured of the less prescriptive:
`A new body of health and safety legislation should be
prepared, based on the philosophy of the goal-setting
approach rather than the alternative philosophy of Govern-
ment prescription.’
Cullen, 1990
This led to a sweeping and fundamental change in the
regulation of the industry. The core of this is the safety case
regime where each installation must provide and have
approved by HSE a safety argument covering its full life
from design to abandonment. Cullen did not have any doubt
however about the need to reinforce this overall philosophy
of the safety case with supporting regulations:
`to give the safety case regime a solidity which it might
otherwise lack.’
Cullen, 1990
It has taken from 1991 to this year, about a ® ve-year
period, to revoke and revise legislation on these linesÐ a
not inconsiderable achievement. The last plank was nailed
into place last June in the form of the Offshore Installations
and Wells (Design and Construction etc) Regulations 1996.
They have four parts dealing with:
(1) Installation integrity;
(2) Well safety;
(3) Workplace safety;
(4) Veri® cation of safety-critical items.
Two interesting and rather new concepts come in hereÐ
`integrity’ and `veri® cation’ .
Integrity is a concept encompassing the older Construc-
tion and Survey Regulations and `® tness for purpose’ and
yet at the same time seeking to incorporate more general
objectives for design and construction. The design should
seek to preserve integrity through all phases of life and
include so far as foreseeable accidental and extreme events,
operational activities, maintenance and repair, and decom-
missioning. Operational safe limits are a part of this, as are
regular assessments of integrity, and remedial work when
appropriate. This is a natural extension of the safety case
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regulations and regime; one might expect compliance with
these regulations to merge into the safety case approach as it
evolves. A responsible and competent operator could and
would argue that a holistic approach is what he or she offers
and what the regulations demand.
Why then have veri® cation? It is a check in the system.
The intention is to have safety-critical elements of an
offshore installation veri® ed as suitable by an independent
and competent person, rather like a regulatory check
without a regulator, since veri® cation replaces the duties
of certifying authorities which were not part of but were
appointed by the regulator, HSE. The duty now lies ® rmly
with the operator to provide his or her own effective
veri® cation arrangements. One might feel that a more
controlled system should creep in, possibly through some
form of formal recognition of verifying bodies and
standards.
How then does this affect the problem of a mature
industry striving to survive and prosper? Rather as a threat
and an opportunity. The threat is two-edged: excess rigidity
in the application of the new regulations will kill the
industry through costs; excess liberality will kill it through
disaster and the reaction to that. The opportunity is the Holy
Grail of improving safety and at the same time reducing
operating costs.
This is achievable because the regulations allow an
operator to make his or her own decisions on some high-cost
areas, notably maintenance and inspection, where the
shutdown costs can be very large. `Safety-critical elements’
are the nub, de® ned in the Regulations as:
`such parts of an installation and its plant (including
computer programs), or any part thereof,
(a) the failure of which could cause or contribute substan-
tially to; or
(b) a purpose of which is to prevent, or limit the effect of, a
major accident.’
The language is tortuous but the meaning plain: use
consequences as the identi® er. The safety-critical elements
then require performance standards for their functionality,
availability, reliability and survivability. These standards
can be set on a balance of probability and consequence: risk.
That is the route allowing the previously statutory inspec-
tions to be relaxed, if one has a ® rm grasp of the risks run.
The regulations came into force last June and the industry
has two years to come to terms with them and comply. One
of the dif® culties will come from the uneven level of
scenario modelling in current safety cases. In some cases
more development will be needed to get full bene® t from
risk-based performance standards.
Is UK Ltd equipped to do this? Perhaps. There is a
resource problem of staff capable of applying risk-based
techniques. It is not a subject really taught at undergraduate
engineering level where there is already quite enough to do
familiarizing students with design practices. The techniques
to cope with degradation, the design of maintenance and
inspection regimes are more usually learnt by doing it in the
industry, where the risk-based culture is new. Old dogs and
new tricks.
There has been some ® lling of the gap during the last ® ve
years and the development of safety cases by transferring
expertise and people from industries that have worked more
and longer with risk-based approaches such as the nuclear
and aviation, but it has had to be blended with practical
offshore experience to be of use. The next few years will
show us if we can extend and develop the approach as a
national industry and will require the creation of a new
workforce both inside and outside the oil companies,
including within HSE where the same issues of changing
culture apply.
For the longer term the engineering institutions could do
worse than consider their response to the move to risk-based
methods. I at least believe that these methods are an
essential requirement for our future competitiveness, but
their incorporation into continuing education or corporate
membership requirements is very patchy.
Finally, what are the personal risks of middle age? For
those readers round about their half century the risk of death
from all causes is around 6 ´10-3 per year, about 4 ´10-4
of which is due to external causes. HSE consider the
maximum tolerable risk to workers in any industry to be
1 ´10-3. Being middle-aged is quite like working in a risky
industry really.
Michael Brown
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